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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Justin 8. Miller asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of the Idaho
Court of Appeals, 2014 Opinion No. 76 (Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2014) (hereinafter, Opinion).
In its Opinion, the Court of Appeals correctly determined that the evidentiary rulings of
the district court during the trial were erroneous. However, Mr. Miller submits that the
Opinion, which affirmed his judgment of conviction, is in conflict with previous decisions
of the Idaho Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals because the Court of Appeals
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point, two other

hit her head on
came into

room, and Ms. Miller and the female guest who had been pushed exited and went to the
kitchen. (Trial Tr., Vol I, p.278, L.14-p.279, L.3, p.281, Ls.16-25, p.173, Ls.9-25.)
Mr. Miller began directing his guests to leave the house. (Trial Tr., Vol I, p.281,
Ls.10-13, p.282, Ls.3-5, p.319, Ls.2-6.) After twice asking people to leave, he grabbed
a shotgun from a shelf in the closet, but once he got it into his hands, another guest
immediately grabbed it and took it away. (Trial Tr., Vol I, p.282, L.23 - p.283, L.9; Trial

1

The designation "Trial Tr., Vol I" shall refer to the transcript of the trial on August 13,
14, and 15, 2012. The designation "Trial Tr., Vol II" shall refer to the transcript of the
trial on the afternoon of August 14, 2012.
2
At trial, Melissa Miller testified that she had sat down on the bed next to her sleeping
husband, and that she startled him, causing him to fling his arm such that it knocked her
off the bed onto the floor. (Tr., p.274, L.17 - p.276, L.4.) He was bending over her,
attending to her in the darkened bedroom when the female guest came into the room.
(Tr., p.276, L.5 - p.277, L.13.)
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for pointing the weapon

for

hitting his wife,

Nadine Steen, and battery for pushing the female

guest who tried to intercede in the interaction between Mr. Miller and his wife;
additionally, the State sought a deadly weapon enhancement. (R., pp.190-192.)
Mr. Miller exercised his constitutional right to a jury trial.

The jury acquitted

Mr. Miller of domestic battery; however, it convicted him of aggravated assault and
battery. (R., pp.291-292.) The district court imposed upon Mr. Miller a unified sentence
of five years, with two years fixed, following his conviction for aggravated assault and
180 days for battery. (R., pp.309-311.) The district court gave Mr. Miller an opportunity
to participate in the retained jurisdiction program.

(R., pp.309-311.) Mr. Miller filed a

timely Notice of Appeal from the Judgment - Retained Jurisdiction. (R., pp.316-318.)
On appeal, Mr. Miller asserted that the district court erred in allowing a witness to testify
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Preliminarily, as

Officer Cady

testify that

parked his car far away because there was a gun involved, the Court of Appeals
determined that there was an adverse ruling to defense counsel's relevance objection,
concluding that "the district court implicitly overruled the objection by allowing the
testimony to proceed." (Opinion, p.4.) The Court held that the testimony of where the
officer parked was irrelevant as it "was not needed to enable the jury to understand how
the charged offenses came about or to provide needed background about the offenses.
Rather, the officer described events that took place after Miller's alleged criminal
conduct had ceased" and such testimony was "not necessary to give the jury a
complete story, and its absence would not have left any confusing gap in the narrative
or resulted in misleading inferences." (Opinion, pp.4-5 (emphasis original).) However,
the Court found that any error was harmless, concluding that the officer's statement
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Mr. Miller submits that the Idaho Court of Appeals incorrectly found that it was

to
that the Idaho

Idaho

Idaho Supreme Court and its own precedent, as well as the United
Court precedents regarding the standard for harmless error, Mr. Miller's Petition for
Review should be granted.

B.

Standard For Granting Petitions For Review
Idaho Appellate Rule 118(b) provides that, "[g]ranting a petition for review from a

final decision of the Court of Appeals is discretionary on the part of the Supreme Court,
and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons .... " Factors to
be considered include whether the Opinion is in conflict with a previous decision of
either the Idaho Supreme Court, the Idaho Court of Appeals, or the United States
Supreme Court. I.AR. 118(b)(2), (3).
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which could

jury. Yet the Court of Appeals found

these statements were cumulative to evidence already introduced, and therefore the
statements' admission was harmless error. Two errors which firmly established what
Ms. Steen told the 911 operator, and bolstered her credibility not once, but twice, could
not be harmless error, particularly where the trial hinged on Ms. Steen's credibility.
Because the Idaho Court of Appeals' analysis is in conflict with precedent from
both the Idaho Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court that define the
nature of harmless error review, Mr. Miller's Petition for Review should be granted.
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that burden, the State must "prove[ ] 'beyond a reasonable

doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."' Id. at 221
(quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24).
In interpreting Chapman, the United States Supreme Court has explained that:
To say that an error did not "contribute" to the ensuing verdict is not, of
course, to say that the jury was totally unaware of that feature of the trial
later held to have been erroneous. . . . To say that an error did not
contribute to the verdict is, rather, to find that error unimportant in relation
to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as
revealed in the record.
Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991 ), overruled in part on other grounds by
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 n.4 (1991 ). Thus, the inquiry of an appellate court

"is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely
have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was
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the truth of the matter asserted therein, is generally considered hearsay, and that
hearsay is generally inadmissible. l.R.

801 (c), 802.

Hearsay, which is made generally inadmissible by Idaho Rule of Evidence
802, is defined as: "a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted." I.RE. 801 (c). The hearsay rule not only prohibits
repetition of the actual out-of-court statement; it also applies where the
witness attempts to convey the substance or purport of the statement.
Therefore, a hearsay objection may not be avoided merely by having the
witness give a summary of the conversation or convey the purport of the
information received rather than relating the details of the statement. If the
purpose of such testimony is to prove the truth of facts asserted in the outof-court statement, the proffered testimony is hearsay. See 2 KENNETH
S. BROUN et al., McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 249 at 104-105 (John
W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter McCORMICK]; State v. Judkins,
242 N.W.2d 266 (Iowa 1976); Commonwealth v. Parks, 273 Pa.Super.
506, 417 A.2d 1163 (1979); Schaffer v. State, 777 S.W.2d 111
(Tex.Cr.App.1989).

10

911

I,

1

1.)
Q.

[D]id

911

A. Yes, I did.
Q. How long do you think your conversation was with the 911

approximately

A. I would
Q. Did

tell

minutes.
to you?

1

: I
it.

It

It is

A.

BY MR. VERHAREN: Did you indicate to the 911 operator that
Mr. Miller pointed a shotgun at you?

Q.

A. Yes.
MR. LOATS: That does call for hearsay, the content of what she said.
THE COURT: Overruled. The witness is present under oath and subject
to cross-examination.
BY MR. VERHAREN: Go ahead and answer.

A. Yes, I did.
(Trial Tr., Vol I, p.228, L.18- p.229, L.14.)
Mr. Miller asserted on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by
admitting Nadine Steen's hearsay statement to the 911 operator. At trial, Ms. Steen
testified that she told the 911 operator that Mr. Miller had threatened her with a gun.
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present testimony relating the witness's own past statements is hearsay."). The Court
of Appeals correctly found that there was no purpose for offering the statement other
than for the truth of the matter asserted, and no l.R.E. 801 (d) nonhearsay categories
applied.

(Opinion, p.11.)

By definition the testimony offered was hearsay and the

district court erred in overruling Mr. Miller's hearsay objection.
However, the Court of Appeals did err in finding that the admission of the out of
court statement was harmless. The United States Supreme Court has described the
harmless error doctrine as follows:
If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not
influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the
judgment should stand ... But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after
pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from
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bolstered Nadine Steen's credibility. The State offered the out of court statement for the
truth of the matter asserted. It was hearsay and the district court erred when it allowed
the testimony to be presented to the jury.

Because there was a timely objection,

Mr. Miller only had the duty to prove that an error occurred, "at which point the State has
the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."
Perry, 150 Idaho at 222.

The ultimate issue in dispute was whether Mr. Miller pointed a firearm at Nadine
Steen. While there was other evidence on which the jury could have based its verdict,
evidence was conflicting and there were no witnesses other than Ms. Steen. Thus the
case was primarily based upon whose version of events the jury believed. See Joy, 155
Idaho at 12.

The State utilized the hearsay testimony to bolster Nadine Steen's
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· Trial Tr., Vol

p.47, L.23, p.89, Ls.2-20.) The fact is that, while portions of her story

were corroborated by some eyewitnesses, other eyewitnesses controverted her claim.
However, not one witness testified that they saw Mr. Miller aim the gun at Ms. Steen,
cock it, and threaten to shoot her.

Ms. Steen's credibility was also questionable

because she had been drinking and several witnesses testified that she was anywhere
from drunk to very drunk. 5 (Trial Tr., Vol I, p.267, L.11 - p.268, L.20, p.298, Ls.12-13,
Trial Tr., Vol II, p.52, Ls.3-4.) The prosecutor even told the jury that this was "strictly a
3

Ms. Steen testified that she called 911 fifteen minutes after the incident. (Trial Tr., Vol
I, p.216, Ls.22-25.)
4
One guest testified that she saw Mr. Miller waving the gun around and telling people to
leave, but not pointing it at any one person. (Trial Tr., Vol I, p.178, L.9- p.179, L.21.)
5
The prosecutor admitted, "[t]hose women did drink. They were, to whatever degree,
intoxicated." (Trial Tr., Vol I, p.396, Ls.12-13.)
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what occurred could have swayed the jury on whether Mr. Miller pointed the gun at
Ms. Steen.

This error was not "unimportant in relation to everything else the jury

considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record." See Yates, 500 U.S. at
403. Thus, it cannot be said, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the verdict was "surely
unattributable" to the admission of the statement by Ms. Steen to the 911 operator. The
district court's error in admitting the evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 227; see also Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
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1 - p.99, L.6.) The district court specifically overruled

the hearsay objection and apparently overruled the relevance objection, as the
testimony was allowed to be presented to the jury. (Trial Tr., Vol I, p.99, Ls.3-8.) There
was no reason to offer testimony about where the officers parked their vehicles. The
testimony did not have a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the action more or less probable.

The evidence was completely

irrelevant and should not have been presented to the jury. The district court abused its
discretion allowing the evidence to be admitted.
The Court of Appeals correctly found that the statement as to the reason why the
law enforcement officers parked where they did was irrelevant.

(Opinion, p.5.) The

Court of Appeals correctly held that the testimony of where the officer parked was
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. 403 creates a balancing test. On

one hand, the trial judge must gauge the probative worth of the proffered evidence by
focusing upon the degrees of relevance and materiality of the evidence, and the need
for the issue on which it is to be introduced. Davidson v. Beco Corp., 114 Idaho 107,
111 (1987). At the other end of the equation, the trial judge must consider whether the
evidence results in unfair prejudice. Id.
To some extent, all probative evidence is prejudicial. State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho
83, 88 (Ct. App. 1989).

The question is whether that prejudice is unfair; whether it

harms the defendant because it is so inflammatory that it would lead the jury to convict
regardless of other facts presented. Id.
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The admission of the evidence was not harmless error.

explained in Section

C, and incorporated herein by reference, because there was a timely objection,
Mr. Miller only has the duty to prove that an error occurred, "at which point the State has
the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."

Perry, 150 Idaho at 222. The State cannot show the error was harmless in this case.

E.

Under The Doctrine Of Cumulative Error, The Accumulation Of Irregularities
During Trial Was Sufficient To Warrant A New Trial
Mr. Miller asserts that that numerous substantial errors occurred in his trial.

Those were the errors discussed herein, in addition to the errors identified in the
Appellant's Brief and found by the Court of Appeals in its Opinion, which are
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Even assuming

arguendo that this Court finds that they were harmless, the accumulation of the errors
and irregularities
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his right
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his convictions
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and that

this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand the matter for a new trial.
DATED this 101h day of December, 2014.

Depufy State Appell te Public Defender
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